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The  economic  literature  attaches  great  importance  to  the  analysis  of  “professional 
motivations”, in particular examining the possible crowding-out effects between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivations. This article applies these questions to the healthcare professions with a 
view to providing a fair scaling of the implementation of pay-for-performance policies by 
public decision-makers. We assemble a panel of 528 independent general practitioners in the 
“Provence-Alpes-Côte  d’Azur”  region  in  France  and  provide  an  inter-personal  statistical 
decomposition between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations with regard to preventive actions. 
The proportion of intrinsic motivations is relatively greater among physicians paid with fixed 
fees. The significant effect of age describes a U shape which can be interpreted as being the 
result of a “life cycle of medical motivations”. Finally, econometric estimations demonstrate a 
correlation between a small proportion of intrinsic motivation and a feeling of injustice with 
regard to the reforms. The cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow us to draw any 
conclusions concerning the direction of the causality. But the above correlation would seem to 
support the theory that the implementation of a policy based on monetary incentives towards 
performance  is  perceived  as  being  offensive  and  may  be  accompanied  by  a  reduction  in 
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La  littérature  économique  fait  désormais  une  large  place  à  l’analyse  des  « motivations 
professionnelles »,  examinant  notamment  les  possibles  effets  d’éviction  entre  motivations 
extrinsèques et intrinsèques. Le présent article propose des transposer ces questions dans le 
champ des professions de santé, avec l’enjeu d’un juste dimensionnement du recours aux 
politiques de paiement à la performance par le décideur public. Nous mobilisons un panel de 
528 médecins généralistes libéraux de la région « Provence Alpes Côte d’Azur » en France et 
proposons une décomposition statistique interindividuelle entre motivations extrinsèques et 
intrinsèques dans le domaine des actions de prévention. La part des motivations intrinsèques 
est relativement plus importante chez les médecins pratiquant les tarifs conventionnés. L’effet 
significatif  de  l’âge  suit  une  courbe  en  U  qu’on  peut  interpréter  comme  le  résultat  d’un 
« cycle  de  vie  des  motivations  médicales »  ou  comme  celui  d’un  effet  génération.  Enfin, 
l’estimation  économétrique  établit  une  corrélation  entre  une  faible  part  de  motivation 2 / 16 
intrinsèque et le sentiment d’injustice concernant les réformes.  La nature transversale des 
données ne permet pas de conclure quant au sens de la causalité, mais la relation mise en 
évidence semble bien alimenter la thèse selon laquelle la mise en place d’une politique basée 
sur  les  incitations  monétaires  à  la  performance  est  jugée  comme  désobligeante  et  peut 
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Introduction 
The emphasis placed on asymmetric information, which a physician can use to his advantage, 
has for the most part masked the existence of different levels of intent. One means of taking 
the  diversity  of  possible  attitudes  at  work  into  consideration  is  to  divide  the  concept  of 
“professional motivation” into intrinsic motivations (IMs) and extrinsic motivations (EMs), 
following the reasoning outlined in the field of social and cognitive psychology (Déci, 1971). 
Intrinsic  motivations  relate  to  activities  that  are  practised  with  a  view  to  obtaining  direct 
intrinsic satisfaction which is derived without expecting compensation or attempting to avoid 
any feeling of guilt
i.  Extrinsic motivations relate to activities which are practised with a view 
to obtaining gratification exogenous to the activity itself, for example payment.  
This framework allows us to question the efficiency of monetary incentive policies. Monetary 
compensation constitutes a sub-group of EMs which can weaken the motivations under the 
control of individuals, i.e. the IMs. Both types of motivation may suffer from crowding out by 
the other, as demonstrated in Titmuss’ famous example (1970) concerning blood donation
ii. 
This author points out that a commercial policy in a sphere where social norms play a major 
role  may  not  only  stimulate  selfish  behaviour  but  also  have  irreparable  long-term 
consequences, where “the price of a price” is the disappearance of an efficient norm of social 
approval (Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst, 2004). 
This crowding-out effect, which calls into question the efficiency of “effort for the money” 
policies, has been widely supported in the field of economics following the works of Frey 
(1997)  or  Kreps  (1997).  Bénabou  and  Tirole  (2003)  attempted  to  reconcile  the  economic 
(individuals respond to incentives) and psycho-sociological perspectives (the incentives may 
prove counterproductive) by identifying the conditions in which an agent (an employee, a 
child) uses the policy of the principal (an employer, a teacher or a parent) to learn how he 
appears to him (the “looking-glass-self”). An incentive has hidden costs by revealing to the 
agent a piece of information concerning the trust granted by the principal (Falk and Kosfeld, 
2006; Sliwka, 2007). It modifies the perception of the interaction on the part of the agent who 
can use the principal’s policy as a signalling device.  
Nevertheless, by definition, a financial incentive does not only demonstrate negative effects 
and not all compensation is counterproductive. For example, the theory identifies a crowding-
in effect when EMs are considered by the agent as a reward for effort. Some authors believe 
that the relationship between IMs and EMs is not linear and shows a discontinuity in the 
relationship between monetary incentives  and performance (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; 4 / 16 
James, 2005): in the same individual, it is possible to observe a better performance in the 
absence  of  monetary  incentives  than  when  minimum  incentives  are  introduced,  while  his 
performance may increase with the level of incentives when these become more attractive. 
Empirical works have attempted to isolate these different effects and the results obtained are 
somewhat  contradictory:  the  effect  of  compensation  on  IMs  depends  on  the  type  of 
compensation and the type of indicator adopted to measure the IMs – for example autonomy 
or the declared interest for the task – (Cameron et al., 2001). Moreover, despite numerous 
experimental studies on this subject (e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Deci et al. 1999; 
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Fehr and Falk, 2002), it is still difficult 
to empirically identify a crowding-out effect outside the laboratory (using surveys) as a result 
of the difficulty in isolating and measuring motivations “in the field”. In the field of medicine, 
the few studies carried out reveal that certain types of incentive may result in a crowding-out 
effect through the deterioration of work conditions as perceived by the GP, while other types 
of incentive may cause a crowding-in effect by improving physicians’ competences by means 
of a “personal development policy” (Gené-Badia et al, 2007) or by creating the conditions 
necessary for greater autonomy and promoting “professional values” (McDonald et al, 2007).  
These studies were carried out in the context of optimising physician payment schemes which 
are  more  personalised  and  performance-related.  By  means  of  financial  compensation,  the 
“Quality  and  Outcomes  Framework”  (QOF)  programme  in  England  or  the  “Pay  for 
Performance” (P4P) programme in the United States aim to encourage physicians to show 
concern for the quality of primary healthcare. They primarily refer to the field of prevention 
wherein a series of measurable indicators are more likely to be achieved. Nevertheless, the 
conditions  under  which  quality  incentives  in  healthcare  are  effective  have  not  been  fully 
identified (Grady et al., 1997; Hillman et al., 1998, 1999; Town et al., 2005; Frolich et al. 
2007), thereby justifying the fact that not all countries are committed to this process with the 
same level of intensity (Chaix-Couturier et al., 2000). In France, the legislator very recently
iii 
manifested  his  interest  in  this  type  of  approach,  encouraging  the  evaluation  of  the  legal 
conditions  necessary  for  its  implementation  (Bras  and  Duhamel,  2008).  However, 
implementing pay-for-performance requires knowledge of professional motivations in order 
to forestall any potential crowding-out effect. A necessary requirement is thus to overcome 
the lack of measurement afflicting the concept of IM in the specific context of the medical 
professions.  5 / 16 
With this in mind and based on a survey of professional general practitioners, this article aims 
to  better  understand  the  motivations  of  French  General  Practitioners  (GPs)  to  practise 
preventive  procedures.  The  study  highlights  the  importance  of  IMs  and  investigates  the 
hypothesis  of  a  possible  crowding-out  effect  on  IMs  by  EMs.  To  this  end,  it  presents 
empirical  evidence  based  on  a  model  of  the  share  of  IMs  in  relation  to  EMs  and  on  an 
econometric estimation using the GPs’ self-reported reactions to the policy decisions about 
“the rational use of medicines”, introduced by the French authorities in the last ten years and 
relying on the concept of “medicalized control of health expenditures” (implementation of a 
National Objective of Health Insurance Expenditure - ONDAM – and attempt to introduce 
regulatory practice guidelines known as références médicales opposables – RMOs – which 
planned fines and rewards depending on whether the target of health expenditures growth is 
observed). 
 
1.  A decomposition of intrinsic / extrinsic motivations in the analysis of 
preventive procedures 
 
Performing preventive procedures may be based on two motivations. 
·  It may result from financial incentives offered by the public authorities. In this case, 
the physician is assumed to consider prevention and public health objectives in terms 
of “cost/benefit analysis” where the opportunity cost of medical time is evaluated as a 
monetary  equivalent  (under  fee-for-service,  it  is  medical  time  which  conditions 
income).  Such  an  approach  is  likely  to  correlate  with  an  increasing  number  of 
procedures, overbilling and few free procedures. This is typically a case of EM. 
·  Preventive actions may result from a deliberate and disinterested behaviour on the part 
of  the  physician.  Consequently,  prevention  is  more  frequently  associated  with 
motivations such as a concern for public health, the feeling of effectiveness in the 
process of health education etc. – a group of intrinsic factors which are nevertheless 
still to be identified more precisely. 
 
To evaluate these two levels of motivation, we use a telephone survey carried out in 2006 on a 
panel of 600 self-employed GPs practising in the PACA region
iv and devoted to public health, 
prevention and health education. Preventive procedures performed by GPs were the subject of 
a  specific  study  aimed  at  quantifying  these  practices  which  are  of  great  benefit  but  not 6 / 16 
necessarily implemented by all GPs with the same level of intensity. A synthetic prevention 
score was computed in order to rank physicians with regard to the frequency with which they 
perform 16 different preventive procedures according to the following scale: very often, often, 
sometimes and never (see appendix and Aulagnier et al., 2007). As these items are allocated 
values ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (very often), the score obtained by adding the answers for 
each  action  can,  theoretically,  vary  from  16  to  64.  The  GPs  were  then  divided  into  two 
categories according to their “prevention score”, [16-50] and [50-64], accounting for 75% and 
25% of the respondents respectively
v. Initially, we use a simple logistic regression to model 
the probability that a physician will obtain a score which falls into the interval [50-64]. 
 
1.1 Regression model and categorising variables 
 
The regressors are selected from the set of variables provided by the questionnaire by means 
of an automatic step-by-step procedure. The table below provides information concerning the 
independent variables of the logistic model and their level of significance.  
 
Table 1: The determinants of prevention. 
 
Variable DDL Pr > F
work time in excess of 45 hours/week 1 0.0002
participation in evaluating professional practices 1 0.0006
participation in training on behavioural and cognitive psychotherapies 1 0.0010
use of referentials and clinical practice guidelines as a source of information 1 0.0011
share in household income > 70% 1 0.0015
thinking that GPs should pay greater attention to public health activities 1 0.0033
performs free procedures 3 0.0059
gender 1 0.0186
resistance from patients as an obstacle to performing preventive activities 1 0.0203
lack of training as an obstacle to performing preventive activities 1 0.0232
favourable to the reform of regular doctors 1 0.0278
need more personnel to undertake public health activities 1 0.0352
use of medical journal with paid subscription as a source of information 1 0.0388
absence of payment as an obstacle to performing preventive activities 1 0.0567












The results of the regression model highlight a number of independent variables acting as 7 / 16 
determinants  of  preventive  procedures  in  general  medical  practice.  The  method  involves 
classifying these variables into three categories: IM, EM and control variables, in order to 
estimate the relative importance of IMs and EMs in the effective behaviour of physicians. 
The control variables correspond to certain determinants of preventive practice which  are 
“independent” of the physician’s motivations, for example physician gender will primarily 
reflect  the  composition  of  his/her  practice  (women  GPs  treat  more  women  patients)  and 
determine  the  high  frequency  of  certain  preventive  procedures  (gynaecological  screening) 
without any real relation to motivations.  
Among the independent variables adopted in this model, five are identified as “markers” of 
physicians’  IMs  to  perform  certain  preventive  procedures:  “thinking  that  GPs  should  pay 
greater attention to the public health dimension”, “participation in training on behavioural and 
cognitive therapies”, “not considering certain obstacles to prevention as a barrier to physician 
involvement  in  preventive  care  activities”  (three  variables  for  three  types  of  obstacles: 
resistance by patients, lack of training on prevention, lack of payment). GPs answering these 
questions positively are assumed to be intrinsically motivated by public health and prevention 
activities. 
We identify three extrinsic incentive variables (captured here by their negative slope, making 
them “disincentives”): “need more personnel to undertake public health activities”, “rarely 
performing free procedures”, “reported consultation length is under 15 minutes”. These three 
variables summarise the idea that prevention “takes time” without having any effect other 
than  improving  the  quality  of  healthcare  provided  to  patients  (answering  yes  to  these 
questions suggests that healthcare quality is not pursued for itself). They are therefore, for the 
most part, EMs (negative given the sense of the question). The last two variables are a very 
direct evaluation of the “opportunity value” that each physician allocates to the time spent on 
medical activities. We believe that including them in a regression explaining the probability of 
being  more  or  less  active  in  terms  of  prevention  reflects  the  relevance  of  the  “waste  of 
time/money” obstacle which exists in self-employed practice with regard to time-consuming 
activities such as prevention. 
 
1.2 Calculating the relative weight of each type of motivation 
 
After categorizing the variables into three distinct vectors as described above, the logistic 









ext + µ 
where  X  is  the  group  of  control  variables,  M
int  the  group  of  IM  variables  (five  column 
vectors), M
ext the group of EM variables (three column vectors) and P the GPs’ estimated 
propensity to provide a high level of prevention practices. Once the model has been estimated 
and the value of the regression vectors β, γ
int, γ
ext has been determined, we can calculate the 
following quantity for each GP: 










, with partint  ] 1 , 0 [ Î  
M
int and M
ext differ from one GP to other depending on the presence or absence of the 8 (5+3) 
basic motivations underlying their construction. For each physician i, the quantity “partint” 
measures the part accounted for by IMs in the probability that the GP belongs to the category 
of  physicians  who  are  highly  active  in  the  field  of  prevention.  This  is  an  individual 
measurement of the contribution of IMs to the propensity Pi of each physician to perform 
certain preventive procedures (relative to the total represented by the IMs and EMs together). 
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2.  Modelling the share of intrinsic motivations in relation to extrinsic 
motivations 
 
We note that the proportion accounted for by IMs in relation to physician’s total motivations 
varies considerably from one individual to another. Beyond the mere measurement of this 
interpersonal heterogeneity, it is interesting to identify with which variables (or with which 
determinants) a dominant set of IMs is associated for a given level of prevention. A second 
regression model is now presented to determine the explanatory variables of the proportion of 
IMs. Among the explanatory variables identified, the “feeling of injustice” is of particular 
interest to us. 
 
2.1 Identifying a model of intrinsic motivation 
 
We consider the share of intrinsic motivations in physician’s total motivations, ranging from 0 
to  1,  as  a  variable  of  interest. The  series  is  truncated,  both  to  the  left  and  right,  thereby 
justifying the use of a TOBIT model. We obtain the following results (backward selection, p 
threshold = 0.10): 
 
Table 2: Results of the model 
 
Working in sector 1, where physicians are paid by a fixed-fee per consultation, is positively 
correlated with IM (and thus adhesion to sector 2, where free pricing prevailed, is negatively 
linked to IMs). This result could reflect a self-selection effect. Nevertheless, the estimation is 
not  significant  at  5%  (p=0.063),  thereby  limiting  its  scope.  The  same  is  true  for  the 
geographic situation and the location of the medical practice in a large urban centre, which 
would appear to have a positive effect on  IMs. We have  chosen to comment on the two 
destructive effects (significant at 5%) of IMs: age and the feeling of injustice. 
Dependant variable Comparison Coefficients Standard Error P-value
Constant 1.19470 0.32485 0.0002
Age -0.02483 0.01256 0.0480
Age-squared 0.00025 0.00012 0.0378
Practice sector 1 vs 2 0.02878 0.01549 0.0633
Build-up area > vs < 200k. Inhab. 0.02094 0.01186 0.0774
Feeling of injustice Yes vs No -0.02506 0.01144 0.028510 / 16 
 







Let us first examine the effect of age. During their period of activity, it is at the age of about 
49  that  the  share  of  IMs  in  physicians’  total  motivations  is  the  weakest.  The  graph 
representing the age effect is convex: we observe a fall in the share of intrinsic considerations 
in favour of extrinsic ones (all other things being equal) between the ages of 35 (lower limit) 
and 49, thereafter followed by a reversal of the trend. 
These results may indicate a “life cycle of medical motivations” with an initially perverse 
effect  of  the  increasing  volume  of  physician’s  activity  on  IMs  (the  phase  when  financial 
constraints are most significant). Then, after 50 years old, age and a relaxing of the financial 
constraints encourage physicians to adopt an attitude more favourable to expressing their IMs. 
We can assume that this graph, presenting cross sectional data, may also reflect a generational 
effect. It would reveal that older physicians are driven more by IMs whereas younger ones 
find themselves in an environment which promotes the expression of EMs. The data do not 
enable us to separate these different assumptions. It is nevertheless interesting to compare this 
graph  with  that  obtained  when  analysing  the  question  concerning  “physician  professional 
satisfaction” (profile obtained as a cross section for an identical panel of 1,901 doctors, but 
extended to 5 regions). 
 11 / 16 








We note an age profile of professional satisfaction relatively similar to that established for 
“partint”. This would tend to support the methodology adopted here: when physicians are 
asked directly about their level of professional satisfaction, it would appear that the same 
findings as those identified through our own method hold, i.e. a life cycle of IMs in the choice 
of preventive practices. 
 
2.2 The role of the feeling of injustice 
 
To  date,  the  study  has  allowed  us  to  demonstrate  and  analyse  the  importance  of  IMs  in 
physicians’ attitudes towards prevention but not to confirm the crowding-out hypothesis. At 
best, we can state that the extent of the IMs identified in these statistics pleads for caution 
when implementing any economic policy oriented towards financial compensation. The only 
information available to us here is an opinion, a reaction to the so-called public policies of 
“rational use of medicines”. Indeed, during the survey, we asked the following question; “do 
you find the implementation of actions promoting rational use of medicines, which aimed at 
limiting the increase in healthcare spending, unfair with regard to yourself?”. 12 / 16 
We might think that the “feeling of injustice” expressed may be perceived as a bias which is 
inherent  to  declaratory  data  and  can  therefore  be  considered  as  unreliable.  However,  an 
increasing number of works, mirroring certain results provided in the field of comprehensive 
sociology, tend to give credence to the claims of those involved (Boltanski and Thévenot, 
2006; Dubet, 2006). These surveys show that when individuals are questioned, they succeed 
in justifying the unfair nature of a situation. By doing so, they create their own construction of 
a “theory of justice” by behaving to a certain extent like philosophers, even if their theory of 
justice is spontaneous or profane. We therefore view justice criteria as a normative reference 
governing models of action. We believe that such a normative reference can be identified 
when  physicians  express  their  discomfort  concerning  policies  promoting  rational  use  of 
medicines introduced by the public authorities in France in recent years. 
These are perceived as control devices threatening the autonomy of physicians. This loss of 
freedom can be combined with the belief in an “offensive” treatment of the profession by the 
public authorities who would have to buy a high-quality practice by means of compensation. 
The incentive can, then, have a perverse effect when it is interpreted as proof of the distrust 
demonstrated by society towards the medical profession, judged incapable of performing its 
missions without obtaining additional payments (Bras and Duhamel, 2008). This criticism 
leads to the activation of new types of motivation, some of which may supplant the others. 
The feeling of injustice with regard to the reforms could exercise a negative effect on IMs, by 
revealing physicians’ perception of an exaggerated appeal to EMs. 
In  our  study,  it  appears  that  the  coefficient  associated  with  the  “feeling  of  injustice”  is 
negative and significant (p = 0.02): a physician feeling that he has been unfairly treated by the 
public authorities is less intrinsically motivated  than a physician who does not share this 
feeling. The Tobit model therefore shows that, all other things being equal, the expression of a 
“feeling of injustice” is associated with a reduction in IMs involved in a preventive procedure. 
In the absence of time data, this statistic does not enable us to identify the direction of the 
causality:  a  low  level  of  IMs  may  increase  the  feeling  of  injustice  just  as  the  feeling  of 
injustice may – as in the theory – destroy the IMs. In the current context, we can only reveal 
the correlation between injustice and IMs. 
 
Conclusion 
One of the advantages of the notion of IMs (Déci, 1971) is to underline that individuals are 
likely to emphasize different facets of their identity: individuals have a reflexive capacity. 13 / 16 
Under the effect of new economic policy measures, it is possible that individuals change the 
balance of their motivations. For instance, actions encouraging the rational use of medicines 
belong to economic incentive mechanisms and can lead physicians to change their attitude by 
adopting an economic way of reasoning (they turn pure “homo-oeconomicus”). Consequently, 
the extrinsic part of their motivation is over-stimulated, possibly at the expense of intrinsic 
considerations when the actions are regarded as “unfair” by physicians. 
We are, of course, a long way from being able to identify these different dimensions of the 
crowding-out effect in the statistical study carried out. In our opinion, this study constitutes an 
initial contribution to a quantitative evaluation of the phenomenon: i) intrinsic motivations 
account for a large part of preventive actions undertaken by GPs ; ii) the feeling of injustice 
would indeed appear to be linked to a pejoration of IMs in medical prevention procedures, 





List of questions used to construct the prevention score: 
How frequently do you perform the following preventive procedures? 
-  Suggest a breast cancer screening mammography for patients between the ages of 50 and 75, every two 
years 
-  Suggest a programme for breaking nicotine addiction for patients who smoke 
-  Identify weight problems in children 
-  Record the Body Mass Index of patients and position it with regard to the thresholds 
-  Suggest the use of a nutrition booklet for obese patients 
-  Inform young patients about contraception 
-  Suggest a Hemoccult test to all patients between the ages of 50 and 75, every two years 
-  Inform patients about the risks of self-medication 
-  Identify any side-effects resulting from multiple prescriptions among elderly people 
-  Suggest an annual preventive consultation 
-  In  your practice, do you  use predefined questionnaires to help identify risk  factors or screen for a 
pathology, such as tests or scales? 
-  Do you ask your patients if they smoke? 
-  How often do you ask your patients this question? 
-  Do you ask patients who smoke if they intend to give up smoking? 
-  How often do you ask your smoker patients this question? 
-  When dealing with nicotine, do you evaluate the level of addiction of patients who smoke? 
 
For all these questions (except questions 4 and 6), the answer scale was as follows: very often (4), often (3), 
sometimes (2), never (1), do not know (0), did not answer (0). For questions 4 and 6, the answer scale was as 
follows: every consultation (4), often (3), no fixed frequency (2), when dealing with a health issue linked to 
nicotine (1), do not know (0), did not answer (0). The score was obtained by adding the answers to these 16 
questions. Cronbach’s alpha for the 16 questions totalled 0.744, thereby enabling us to confirm the reliability of 
the prevention score. 14 / 16 
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Notes 
 
i « One is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when he receives no apparent rewards except 
the activity itself » (Déci, 1971, p.105). 
ii According to Titmuss, blood donation in Britain in the context of a “socialist policy” is more efficient than the 
commercialisation of blood in the United States.  
iii In the social security financing law of 2008, which authorises local health insurance organisations to conclude 
individual contracts (involving financial compensation) with physicians or health centres. This provision 
stipulates the measures taken in 2000. See Bras and Duhamel (2008) 
iv The panel of GPs in the PACA region was defined in March 2002 with a view to analysing their medical 
practices. It was obtained by random sampling stratified according to sex, age and the size of the urban unit 
where the GP practised. To date, six surveys have been completed. The last wave, entitled “Preventive actions 
and public health”, comprised a sample of 528 GPs representative of the GPs in the PACA region. The 
questionnaire they filled-in was using the KABP method (knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, practices) and focussed 
on three main sections: (i) perceived roles, attitudes and opinions in terms of preventive procedures; (ii) the 
obstacles encountered; and (iii) the needs to be satisfied to improve preventive practices. 
v GPs with a high prevention score (second category) are those who perform all 16 actions “often” or even “very 
often” (14x3+2x4=50), although other distributions are possible. 
vi Nevertheless, although it is possible to compare GPs to one another, the high average (62.4% of IMs) is 
difficult to interpret as it is sensitive to the number of IM and EM variables available for the decomposition. 